Islamism and the Libyan Elections
Photo Credit The Election Network
As Libya marks its first national elections for over 50 years and the results in Libya begin to filter out, early indications suggest a massive lead for the political candidates affiliated with Mahmud Jebril’s National Forces Alliance (NFA). What does this mean for the nature of the constitution in Libya, and what effect will it have on the role of Islamism in Libyan politics?
National Forces Alliance – why?
The final results released over the past 96 hours confirm that the liberal NFA have taken a massive lead with 39 of a possible 80 seats.
In the run up to elections many suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction party (J&C) led by Mohamed Sawan were the most well organised of the political parties. However, with as little as two weeks allocated for canvasing, many Libyans were still unfamiliar with party politics – referring to the Alliance as simply “Jebril” at various polling stations, an indication that Libya is having trouble shaking off a culture of personality politics. A well-known personality with a political and diplomatic track record was an area the J&C party were clearly lacking in when Libyans came to the polls.
Religion also still plays an increasingly important but divisive role in Libyan politics. Over the past several months the Eastern part of Libya has witnessed both pro- and anti-Islamist demonstrations, and calls for Sharia’a law. Between May and July this also included half a dozen attacks on diplomatic convoys and embassies, as well as an armed presence at protests by Islamist and Jihadist groups demanding Sharia in Benghazi and Derna.
Given these factors, how can we explain Jebril’s electoral success? Several key achievements are worth highlighting:
Uniting a traditionally divided liberal political block. In Tunisia, an overwhelming number of liberal and secular political groups regularly divide the secular voting block along dozens of different parties – leaving this segment of the electorate disproportionately underrepresented in government. Jebril’s talent for compromise and alliance-forming has united over twenty political parties, ensuring that there was a clear option for voters with liberal or secular tendencies.
distinct inclusive strategy when approaching religion. The union invited all political parties in Libya to form a coalition including Islamist parties, though they rejected this offer. He has since been attacked by many since the beginning of the revolution, accused of being a Qaddafi crony, and even an atheist by prominent cleric Sheikh Ali Al Sallabi. Jebril responded by reaffirming his devoutness but reiterating his political position, that Libyan government needs to be secular to be successful. His refreshing lack of zeal and discretion has led many to him winning new hearts and minds of those who may have already voted along religious lines. Where liberal parties failed in Tunisia and Egypt, Jebril has clearly succeeded.
A track record in government. Jebril is not standing for election and would be disqualified under the election law criteria set out by the HNEC (Higher National Election Committee). However the alliance has still benefited from his reputation as a leader and diplomat, which served him well under the previous executive board. He is no longer associated with the post conflict-mistrust of the NTC, or mismanagement of the current government, which has allowed him to dominate the personality market, with no clear competitors in sight.
Why Islamism wins and the Brotherhood loses
Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood as the world knows it is radically changing just as Islamism is re-emerging as a powerful political force. The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer the doctrinal movement of Hassan Al Banna, or the extra-governmental revolutionary movement of Sayid Qutb. The modern Muslim Brotherhood is composed of a broad constellation of political ideas presenting various ideological products of the Arab Spring. Powerful demands for social and economic justice, as well as the enormity of rebuilding the Libyan economic and political state almost from scratch have made the new mots clés “Freedom” and “construction” rather than faith and observance.
The Muslim Brotherhood has lost its monopoly and hegemony on Islam. Today Islamic alternatives are everywhere, with Hezb Al Watan (headed by former jihadist Abdel-hakim Belhaj), the Salafi Al Asala wal Bina’ party and the longest servest opposition group the National front party, (who had ideologically been linked to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, evolving over the past twenty years but retaining elements of its religious nature). The Islamist option in Libya has come to resemble that of the liberal option in Egypt and Tunisia, an open market space, with no distinct colour but wide spreading regional representation.
Including the popular and pronounced Salafi block in Libya, this would suggest that Islam today still resonate with a significant voting block. In amidst the arguable demise of the Muslim Brotherhood at the elections, was the rebirth of an ever expansive and fashionable alternative with a huge catchment. Islam as a component of party ideology belongs to all parties, secular and religious, violent and non-violent. The Justice and construction party was as much devoured by the appeal of its ideology to other parties, as it was by Jebril’s tact and master stroke over recent months.
Where next for the Justice and Construction party?
A reassessment of their social capital is needed. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood credibility includes decades of social interaction, feedback and evolution. In Libya two weeks of electioneering were not equivalent to thirty years of credibility on the ground.
The J&C Party will explore other grass roots alternatives, and as a well funded political entity with vast support in the petty bourgeoisie they would do well to shadow the National Alliance, whilst simultaneously working on the ground to make up for lost time, and a loss of identity. If they seek to act as an opposition group in Parliament, they may take advantage of early electoral discontent and mistakes made by the government. The Muslim Brotherhood has traditionally been a voice for those marginalised and dissenting voices, a strength which they will surely capitalise on with help from their regional partners, with the golden triangle of Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. The question they will be asking is whether or not they will be able to gain sufficient credibility over the next 12 months of the constitutional assembly, in preparation for full elections.
Why it’s still not over.
The majority of the political seats have been won by the NFA, though there are over 120 individual candidates who will also make their mark on the ideological character of the assembly. The question is, will there be an ideological position stated by these candidates, confirming the voting blocs in the assembly, and if so how would we know? A senior member of the J&C party believe they have around 33 candidates from the independents – which would create a significant block when it comes to voting. The question of Shari’a law as the principal source of law will be discussed, and could be an opportunity for positions to crystallise on this issue. Until this time, at least 60% of the ideological nature of the assembly is still unknown.
What must be made clear is that Libyans still do not pronounce their Liberalism in the way in which their ideological brethren in Tunisia and Egypt pronounce it. Actions will come to define the political and ideological spectrum of ideas over the next 14months, with a dynamic that will build between the governor and the governed.
The 7th of July elections marks the first few successful steps towards a true national conversation and the formation of an equitable social contract. Whilst it confirms the end of a chapter in dictatorship, it marks several new beginnings. What is most fascinating is the revolutionary and accelerating process that ideology is still taking on the ground, and how much more we still have to learn about Libya’s future.