Information, Participation and Reputation
The GNC and the Role of Communication
Photo Credit Reuters
The 2012 elected General National Congress (GNC) has become Libya’s first democratic government since the 1950’s, but the dearth of consistent, controlled and informed communication between the GNC and its populace has only made the government less meaningful to a Libyan society becoming decreasingly democratic in character.
This lack of communication is giving rise to a citizenry that is cynical towards its government and unwilling to participate in politics, ruining the reputations of GNC members, and jeopardizing those members’ solemn duties of overseeing the constitution and building the foundations of a democratic state. However, this degradation can be reversed through a policy of controlled communication, emulating successful Public Relations (PR) practices from democracies across the globe that previously combated the same threat. This policy should slowly improve transparency, and aid Libya’s progression to becoming an informed democratic society, rather than just the holders of a democratically elected government.
Libya’s Cynical Citizenry:
This paper seeks to address two related problems: the GNC’s rapidly regressing reputation and growing Libyan cynicism. While these problems were largely triggered by unchecked communication – through the rumour-mill – they’re inflamed by the lack of a communications strategy to contradict and contextualise these rumours. Two particular mutually re-enforcing problems evidenced in these two cases:
Dr. Fatima Hamroush’s rumoured corruption and nepotism during her tenure as Health Minister, led to protests and death threats against her, which rendered her unable to effectively fulfil her duties. This inability to work, and subsequent lack of progress, resulted in these rumours gaining credibility in the eyes of those entertaining them, deepening their cynicism and worsening her situation to include attacks against her person, to the point that she fled to Ireland.
The viral YouTube video of Chief of Staff Major-General al–Mangoosh being rebuked and ridiculed by Qaddafi’s head of security services Abdullah Sanussi became a popular public talking point. Ignored and un-contextualised by the GNC, this increased cynicism at an important time, as the government was manoeuvring to disband the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) and the ministries of interior and defence were set to announce joint plans to re-construct the nation’s security services. This undermined popular support for the GNC and its security services at a time when they were in desperate need of it, and empowered militias like the SSC and Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi to continue their open and sometimes deadly defiance.
The further this cycle spirals out of control, the more dangerous it becomes. As the GNC’s reputation recedes, public attacks grow and popular cynicism entrenches, the government begins to lose legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Whilst this may sound overly ominous, GNC officials need only remind themselves of Mustafa Abdul-Jalil’s (Head of Libya’s National Transitional Council) ruined reputation and his office’s storming on January 21st 2012, or the more recent GNC HQ storming of October 30th– both by groups who claim to be protesting under-representation and lack of faith in the competence and credibility of certain ministers.
No Effect without Cause:
While rumours are responsible for driving this problem to its current level, the problem’s source is the GNC, which empowers rumours in two ways: inconsistent messaging on some issues, and a deafening silence on others.
During national crises, citizens rely on their government for re-assurance and understanding. The GNC’s haphazard handling of crises to date does neither, and this empowers rumours to fill the void, as the following examples show:
October 2012’s re-conquest of Gaddafi stronghold Bani-Walid spawned many rumours which toyed with Libyan hearts and minds, including severe human right’s abuses and the alleged capture of the infamous Khamis Qaddafi (Qaddafi’s son, and feared leader of his 32nd brigade) and Moussa Ibrahim, Qaddafi’s widely-loathed former spokesman. In the case of the former the few times officials responded were across brief TV interviews on local media, involving flat denials without addressing these claims’ sources and proofs, leading to widespread distrust amongst the Libyan public. For the latter, Magarief’s own spokesman came out to give these rumours credibility; which deeply affected the government’s own credibility when these rumours turned out to be false.
The September 11th attack on the U.S consulate in Benghazi, similarly lead to an explosion of rumours on the Libyan street over the details of the attack, the question of whether Libyans died protecting the U.S ambassador and the question of who was responsible, among other issues. In return, officials gave clumsy and contradictory responses over mediums ranging from local and international news stations to Twitter, failing to give Libyans the information they wanted. This inflamed popular cynicism to the point that Benghazi’s residents took it upon themselves to forcefully remove the believed culprits from their city; such was their lack of faith in their government to handle the crisis.
Complementary to this is the government’s lack of messaging surrounding plans, progress, and problems. This is problematic insofar as people who lack clear information regarding their government’s actions will be more likely to generate rumours which develop a false authority when not addressed, degenerating into further cynicism. This has been demonstrated by recent protests, on 21st December 2012 in Tripoli, and December 28th in Benghazi. These demonstrations were over issues the government has actually begun tackling, such as the lack of security, or represented a dwindling faith in the government. Both these issues can be addressed through consistent government communication with the public.
The GNC’s relative silence is particularly glaring when viewed in contrast to the regime that preceded it;, Qaddafi would regularly give long-winded public speeches, covering concerns and providing false hopes. Whilst 3 hour tirades are clearly not sound policy, the government’s invisibility is perceived as a sign of weakness when people are yearning for re-assurance. The GNC must show the people that they’re there, they’re aware, and they care about the everyday problems Libyans face.
Combatting cynicism through communication:
Fortunately this problem is not unprecedented; rather, it is the very same problem that gave rise to the field of public relations, which is well developed and has been studied extensively. What is needed is communication that is “planned and carefully controlled, with results monitored (1).”Furthermore, according to studies on “the role of public administrators in shaping public attitudes” and reversing public cynicism: Cynicism infects a population when people feel ignored and disconnected from their government, a government simultaneously perceived at best as incompetent or at worst as “using its power against them (2).” This can provide relevant insight applicable to Libya’s efforts to solve this problem.
This cynicism can be corrected through a three-pronged policy of information, participation, and reputation:
Information: Keeping citizens abreast of policy progressions, the reasoning behind government decisions and how the government is fairly balancing the interests of different groups, and providing consistent, accurate information during crises.
Participation: Conducting public hearings, constructively handling complaints, and using public tools like referenda for controversial issues.
Reputation: Building trust through communicating government successes. This can be accomplished by publicising achievements, responding to negative comments and correcting false ones, and openly demonstrating commitment to ethics through public actions or sanctions.
These three strategies can be accomplished through a public relations system, incorporating a methodology called ‘effective’ communication, whereby “the out-going message is shaped and changed by what comes back.” This allows for handling of all three symbiotically, as it’s a policy where the information is shaped through participation, and both the level and quality of the participation affects and is affected by the government’s reputation.
This policy would allow the GNC to regain the initiative, moving from reactively addressing rumours to taking the initiative and setting the discourse such that “Only a limited number of current events are selected, presented in the media and thus perceived as existent”. This shift would benefit the GNC by focusing public attention and discussion around issues that the GNC is managing, allowing them prioritise and tackle problems with less distractions. This is a tactic used in advanced democracies, which also illustrates how information strategy positively feeds participation strategy; if handled constructively, it will improve the GNC’s reputation as they are judged on their competence in handling these problems rather than on rumour.
Policy Recommendations:
Utilize the Ministry of Information for press conferences: Press conferences should be held routinely to inform the public of policy decisions, and conference recordings should be made accessible. This would begin the process of enhancing the government’s reputation and keeping the citizenry informed and can be carried out for some time whilst other appointments and their infrastructures are being setup.
Appoint A Communications Strategist: Once preliminary prescriptions are implemented, a procedure to appoint main roles should commence. The Communications strategist should come first, as he can aid in other appointments. If no one with the necessary qualifications is available, the GNC could seek to appoint someone with strong: organisational, communication and interpersonal skills, while also contracting a PR firm to provide training. The main duties of a Communications Strategist should be:
Plotting long-term PR strategies harmoniously with proposed policies, coordinating public communications on behalf of the GNC and effectively transmitting high-level policy and its reasoning, thereby allaying misunderstanding and confusion. He should be involved at the highest level of planning and decision-making so that he may draft PR strategies in advance.
Gathering public responses, and relaying them to the GNC; this will require creating systems to direct information to different constituencies and maintaining avenues for responses or public opinion to be measured and collated.
Essentially, the Communications Strategist would disseminate information and facilitate popular participation, thereby enhancing governmental transparency.
Appoint PR Officers: The procedure for these appointments should be similar to the Communications Strategist; however the roles are different. Officer roles should revolve around four tasks: analysis, evaluation, implementation, monitoring:
Analysis: Analysing a policy’s background and ambition, subsequently detailing a list of applicable publics; forging tailored PR approaches for individual policys to be incorporated into the Communications Strategist’s long-term strategy.
Evaluation: Deconstructing any policy’s ultimate goal to short-term objectives addressable throughout the policy’s implementation.
Implementation: Delivering short-term goals to the Communications Strategist, as and when they are implemented, for public exhibition in order to boost reputation.
Monitoring: The participatory side of implementation, here the Communications Strategist’s system’s should be used to consistently collect and handle public responses to policies.
Use the Ministry of Information as a base: For reasons of unification and reachability, the media is the optimal medium for public communications. However, here Libya’s disparate media represents a unique problem as it sometimes provides conflicting or unreliable information about government affairs. The GNC-created Ministry of Information may be able to address this issue by adopting a news-agency style role in delivering information to the public. By acting as a venue for press conferences and providing open access to its recordings, this ministry can both receive journalists’ questions, and set a national discourse through a platform easily accessible to smaller media outlets and the public.
Build internal mechanisms to integrate communications into the policy process: Necessary arrangements must be enacted to allow PR staff access to policy processes from inception to implementation. Resources should be provided to construct internal mechanisms for coordinating information into long, medium and short-term PR strategies and for erecting and operating channels of internal communication and collaboration.
Develop systems for participation: Under the Communications Strategist’s guidance, PR officers should attempt to gauge public opinion by segmenting the population, starting processes like focus groups and polling, designed to help Libyans become more comfortable with these methods of political participation. This is possible either through the Ministry of Information, or through civil-society organisations; however, this is the decision of the Communications Strategist.
Analyse the nation’s media: A review of Libyan media outlets and their ability to provide nationwide and population-wide coverage is needed to ensure effective communication nationally. Undertaken by the Communications Strategist this information will assist in:
Planning PR strategies
Judging the need for additional media outlets
Deciding how to access different population sectors
Investigating which mediums Libyans are most responsive too
Deciding whether state sponsored media is needed, or if encouraging private media growth suffices.
Conclusion:
Executed properly, this policy would benefit all of Libya by keeping Libyans informed and involved in shaping the policies that affect them, and providing the support and space needed for government officials to realise their initiatives. In essence, it would simultaneously weaken the rumour-mill and enhance the democratic credentials of Libyan state and society. Furthermore, this policy would bring an enhanced cohesiveness to the relationship between state and populace, and leaves a structural legacy for future governments to build and benefit from. These benefits derive from the prescribed infrastructure, which would enhance communication mechanisms between departments and ministries; this would make it easier for separate ministries to work together productively, thereby improving governmental efficiency.
The GNC’s core responsibilities to oversee the constitution’s drafting and construct the foundations for future Libyan governments and society to build upon are ideologically inseparable from these strategies of information, participation, and reputation. In a democratic society, the government serves rather than rules its people, and so its legitimacy rests upon its reputation; this fact accentuates the danger of Libyans’ current cynicism, and illustrates why Libya’s future development relies upon its improvement. Moreover, whilst the government’s reputation is integral to its legitimacy, participation and information, as democracy’s very essence, are integral to its purpose. A healthy democratic state relies on its entire populace’s involvement to be truly representative and truly effective at aiding its entire populace.
(1) As prescribed by Fedorcio, Heaton & Madden; three academics who studied the need for and applicability of PR to local government, during the fields’ early days in the UK (1991:1).
(2) E. Berman 1997:106